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Executive Registry

77-1338

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

12 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of State
Secretary of Transportation
Director of Central Intelligence ← → →
Director, Federal Preparedness Agency
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
Director, White House Military Office

SUBJECT: Crisis Staffing Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attached is a copy of Crisis Staffing Procedures prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This document prescribes emergency staffing procedures to be used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and collaborating Department of Defense and Federal Agencies in situations ranging from low level crises to open hostility involving U.S. armed forces. These procedures are under continuous review and are revised when significant changes occur. Comments or proposed changes are invited and should be submitted to the Director, Joint Staff (Attention: NMCS Support Division, J-3), Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that all agencies referred to in these Crisis Staffing Procedures, in writing internal crisis management plans, consider the guidance contained in this document. They further request that copies of those plans be forwarded, along with rosters of designated personnel, to the Director, Joint Staff (Attention: NMCS Support Division, J-3), OJCS.

DJSM-75-73, 11 January 1973, "Emergency Operating Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Implementing Instructions (EOP-II)," and JCS Memorandum of Policy (1st Revision) on Emergency Operating Procedures (Attachment to JCSM-349-71, 27 July 1971) are hereby superseded.

CW Murray

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TALKING PAPERDCI-D/DCI/IC Brief on Warning and Crisis ManagementOVERVIEW

-- Community W/CM operations are complex and decentralized; all agencies have a piece of the action.

-- Each agency conducts W/CM operations and reports findings independently. Interagency efforts are consensus-formation exercises.

-- CM efforts are largely ad hoc.

- o Expertise required is scenario dependent.
- o Insufficient analytical resources available to maintain standing organization.

-- In W/CM operations the DCI has operated essentially as an independent entity, supported by the NIOs and the CIA Opscen.

- o There is no central mechanism for coordination and focusing of collection and analyses across Community boundaries.
- o There is no systematic provision of feedback and guidance from decisionmaking to analytical levels.
- o Restrictive documentation of sensitive intelligence, diplomatic information and military ops data severely hampers analysis/production and creates psychological inhibitants to timely warning.

BACKGROUND

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Post mortem review of Community performance in W/CM

[redacted] reveal following major problem areas:

- o Hard intelligence available was ambiguous, particularly concerning intentions of actions involved;
- o Community was swamped by information resulting from increased collection/reporting and shortage of analytical resources in relevant substantive areas;
- o Community was unable to control effects of uncertainty created internally by factors discussed in overview, preconceptions as to what would or would not happen, and psychological deterrents to crying wolf.

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- Community performances during crisis management periods has been significantly better than during pre-crisis warning periods.
 - o The major cause of uncertainty inhibiting Community operations, i.e., whether a crisis was going to occur, was dissipated;
 - o Common recognition of the parameters of the crisis provided a natural focusing and coordinating mechanism for Community operations;
 - o Consequently, the Community was better able to marshal and direct its resources and effort to optimum effect.

DISCUSSION

-- Ambiguity of available intelligence relating to a developing situation will likely always exist and must be assumed as a given. Thus, the Community will always be potentially vulnerable to the effects of uncertainty.

-- The potential for missing the significance of intelligence acquired as a result of system saturation is endemic, but is greatly compounded by uncertainty at the analytical level caused by lack of sufficient guidance and group pressures.

-- Psychological inhibitants to effective warning operations, the tendency toward preconception, tunnel vision and the desire to avoid being wrong are inherent in human nature and cannot be eliminated. However, their effects can be controlled by effective management of uncertainty.

-- To the extent Community operations are influenced by the aforementioned uncertainty-producing factors, ambiguity inherent in intelligence being evaluated is compounded and the combined effect passed on to consumers in reporting. This tends to reduce the credibility of warning, if issued, and delay consideration or implementation of deterrent hedge action.

SUMMATION

-- The Community can (and should) increase its collection and analytical assets to improve W/CM capabilities. However, to the extent that such measures produce even higher data volumes and a greater number of players, the need for coordination and management of uncertainty is increased.

-- Obtaining more data and analysts will do little if the Community confuses itself and those it supports. Historically, warning failures have occurred not for lack of sufficient information, but as a result of failure to effectively manage uncertainty.

-- To manage uncertainty effectively:

o The Community must operate coherently:

-- There must be a systematic (as opposed to ad hoc) interconnection of components participating in W/CM operations as well as a set of common procedures and instruments (NOIWON, CONTEXT);

-- This system must have a central point of reference from which its status, capabilities, problems and level of performance can be determined at any given time and through which information and guidance from senior Community and National decisionmaking levels can be rapidly and effectively disseminated;

-- The system must be bidirectional, in that those entities and officials being supported must, in turn, actively synchronize the system to support changing policy/decisionmaking requirements as the situation being addressed develops.

o The Community must address the consumer coherently:

-- Decisionmakers and their immediate staffs should not be inundated with redundant paper;

-- Legitimate uncertainty and divergence of view within the Community must reach the decisionmaker, but in an integrated perspective so that latter does not wrongly assume a higher level of uncertainty than really exists, thus distorting the credibility of warning recommendations made;

-- The recipient of Community intelligence reporting should not have to play analyst in attempting to correlate separate agency reporting on the same substantive situation;

-- Formal responsibility for issuing warning should be assigned to specific individuals (the DCI and the J-2 JCS) rather than to agencies or their subelements. To the extent such responsibility is diffused and, in practice, unclear, uncertainty will persist among Community components and between the Community and decisionmakers being supported. In short, where all are perceived to be responsible for warning, in effect no one is.

ISSUES

-- An action program is required to develop the organizational and procedural components of the system outlined above.

o It is logical that the DCI sponsor such a program.

o No significant change in Community organization or division of responsibility required.

o Cost would be relatively low since most changes would be procedural.

-- Does the DCI have the authority to effect changes affecting Community operations (other than CIA)?


- o Mission as "principal intelligence advisor to the President" under E.O. 11905.
- o Presidential action resulting from PRM-11.

-- Potential system approaches:

- o Enhanced NIO capability
- o DCI Crisis Advisor
- o Use CIA as "system center"
- o Independent Community entity under DCI
- o Standing ^{Community Planning} ~~NPB~~ Committee
- o Enhanced SWS capability

LOCATION OPTIONS

- o Where will DCI operate from in action W/CM periods



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IMPLEMENTATION

- o Memo to SECSTATE, SECDEF and Brzezinski outlining problems and needs. *OK*
- o Issue conceptual system design/action plan.
- o Direct Community planning/implementation of system.
- o Put someone in charge of the system--ideally he should also manage system development.

WHAT DO NEXT?

- o Complete tour of physical facilities *OK*

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- o Guidance on DCI physical location/support
- o Guidance on implementation approach

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